عنوان مقاله
رابطه بین رتبه بندی حاکمیت شرکتی و عملکرد مالی
فهرست مطالب
مقدمه
مرور ادبیات
طرح تحقیق و نمونه
بحث
نتیجه گیری
بخشی از مقاله
در این رابطهPjt+T قیمت سهام شرکتj در زمان t+T ، T زمان بین پایان آخرین دوره مالی و تاریخ چاپ نتایج مالی، BVEjt ارزش دفتری سرمایه شرکتj در زمانt تقسیم بر تعداد سهام در گردش درزمان t، NIjt خالص سود شرکت j در زمانt تقسیم بر تعداد سهام در گردش در زمانt ، CGSjt نمرات و زیرنمرات مرکب حاکمیت شرکتی منتشر شده توسطThe Globe and Mail, YEARjt (A2003jt, A2004jt, A2005jt} متغیر ساختگی است که سالهای تحت پوشش مشاهدات را نشان داده و برابر با 1 می باشد و εjt جمله خطا را نشان می دهد.
نمونه بکاررفته در این مطالعه از کلیه شرکت های کانادایی تحت پوشش رتبه بندی و رتبه بندی حاکمیت شرکتی Globe and Mail در طول سالهای 2002 تا 2005 تشکیل شده است که صورت های مالی آنها در پایگاه داده www.sedar.com و داده های مربوط به قیمت سهام در پایگاه داده TSX-CFMRC موجود می باشد.
کلمات کلیدی:
Corporate governance rating and financialperformance: a Canadian studySylvie Berthelot, Tania Morris and Cameron MorrillAbstractPurpose – This paper aims to examine whether the corporate governance rankings published by amarket information intermediary are reflected in the values that investors accord to firms.Design/methodology/approach – Panel data from 289 Canadian firms in the four-year period2002-2005 were analyzed using a price model.Findings – The results suggest that the corporate governance rankings published by the marketinformation intermediary are related to not only firm market value, but also to accounting results.Practical implications – This study provides empirical observations that would be useful for variousorganizations involved in the regulation of corporate governance practices and the standardization ofrelevant data elements.Originality/value – This study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that information publishedby an information intermediary is reflected in firm market values. Moreover, this information appears tobe related to the accounting results. Thus, good governance rankings are reflected in the accountingresults.Keywords Corporate governance, Financial markets, Investors, CanadaPaper type Research paper1. IntroductionThe need for corporate governance to limit conflicts of interest between shareholders andmanagers, and especially the costs generated by such conflicts, is not a new phenomenon.Berles and Means (1932) had argued that managers must be controlled in order to avoidlosses. Financial scandals, as seen at Enron, WorldCom, and Nortel in North America andParmalat in Europe, and the astronomical costs associated with them, have reinforced thisargument. As we have seen, such scandals can cause financial markets to drop sharply,jobs to be lost and pension plan values to plummet. For example, the largest Americanpension fund lost over one billion dollars through its investments in WorldCom (Reuter,2002). The Caisse de de´poˆ t et placement du Que´bec, the largest pension fund in Canada,saw the value of its Nortel investments drop by five billion dollars between August 2000 andthe end of December 2004 (Girard, 2006).Financial scandals in several countries have served as justification for new legislation toregulate corporate governance practices. For instance, the USA passed theSarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 (Beasley and Elder, 2005). In 2005, the Financial ReportingCouncil (FRC) in the UK updated the Turnbull Guidance on Internal Control to be consistentwith internal control reporting requirements as set out in Section 404 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct and the related SEC rules. New regulations were established in Canada as well (Barneset al., 2004), where, most notably, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) addressed theresponsibilities and composition of the Audit Committee (National instrument NI 52-110), theroles of both the chief executive officer and the chief financial officer to ensure the accuracyand quality of reported information, (NI 52-108), and auditor oversight (NI 52-108). In 2005,DOI 10.1108/14720701011085599 VOL. 10 NO. 5 2010, pp. 635-646, Q Emerald Group Publishing Limited, ISSN 1472-0701 j CORPORATE GOVERNANCE j PAGE 635
