عنوان مقاله
ویژگی جریان ترافیک در یک تقاطع بدون علامت در چارچوب تئوری بازی
فهرست مطالب
چکیده
مقدمه
فرمولاسیون مدل
شبیه سازی و بحث
نتیجه گیری
بخشی از مقاله
قانون اصلی:
حق تقدم تنها می‌تواند به یک وسیله نقلیه داده شود و این حق مربوط به وسیله نقلیه‌ای است که در جاده اصلی قرار دارد در مقایسه با دیگر وسایل نقلیه‌ای که در جادة فرعی قرار دارند.
دسته C : راننده‌ای که از قانون اصلی اطاعت می‌کند.
دستهD : راننده‌ای که از قانون اصلی اطاعت نمی‌کند و سعی می‌کند که به گونه‌ای خشونت‌آمیز وارد تقاطع شود.
کلمات کلیدی:
Characteristics of traffic flow at a non-signalized intersection in the framework of game theory Hongqiang Fana , Bin Jia a,∗ , Junfang Tianb , Lifen Yunc a MOE Key Laboratory for Urban Transportation Complex Systems Theory and Technology, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, 100044, China b Institute of Systems Engineering, College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin, 300072, China c Rail Traffic Control and Safety State Key Laboratory, Beijing Jiaotong University, 100044 Beijing, China h i g h l i g h t s • We model the traffic flow at the non-signalized intersection. • The model introduces the game theory into simulating the traffic flow of non-signalized intersection. • We use the Weibull distribution to describe driver’s behavior. • We found one transition regime in the phase diagram. • The existence of defectors is benefit for the capacity of intersection, but also reduces the safety of intersection. a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 30 April 2014 Available online 8 August 2014 Keywords: Cellular automaton model Non-signalized intersection Game theory a b s t r a c t At a non-signalized intersection, some vehicles violate the traffic rules to pass the intersection as soon as possible. These behaviors may cause many traffic conflicts even traffic accidents. In this paper, a simulation model is proposed to research the effects of these behaviors at a non-signalized intersection. Vehicle’s movement is simulated by the cellular automaton (CA) model. The game theory is introduced for simulating the intersection dynamics. Two types of driver participate the game process: cooperator (C) and defector (D). The cooperator obey the traffic rules, but the defector does not. A transition process may occur when the cooperator is waiting before the intersection. The critical value of waiting time follows the Weibull distribution. One transition regime is found in the phase diagram. The simulation results illustrate the applicability of the proposed model and reveal a number of interesting insights into the intersection management, including that the existence of defectors is benefit for the capacity of intersection, but also reduce the safety of intersection. © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction The urban traffic system includes many different facilities such as various level roads and structure intersections. That means vehicles moving in urban traffic must face complex environment, and drivers have to make decisions from time to time to move safely as well as quickly. The unreasonable or wrong decision will make the traffic conditions worsen. The terrible traffic causes many environmental issues such as smog and noise pollution, and huge economic losses. In order to
