عنوان مقاله
تحلیل حساسیت روشهای سیگنال توان به منظور تشخیص و آشکارسازی سخت افزارTrojan
فهرست مطالب
چکیده
مقدمه
تشخیص و آشکارسازیTrojan با سیگنال گذرا منبع تغذیه (IDDT)
راه اندازی آزمایش
نتایج شبیه سازی
نتیجه گیری
بخشی از مقاله
از چهار تکنیک کالیبراسیون سیگنال مستقیم و متناوب روش کالیبراسیون بر مبنای نمونه متناوب از لحاظ هزینه و کیفیت موثرترین می باشد. روش نمونه متناوب یک نمونه را از بین اشکال موج پاسخ کالیبراسیون بلافاصله بعد از ورود ورودی مرحله ای جمع آوری می کند. برای نیل به ویژگیهای امپدانس پورت توان، نمونه مذکور بسنده می کند. ازداده های جمع آوری از هر تست کالیبراسیون برای ساخت ماتریس تبدیل خطی استفاده شده است.
کلمات کلیدی:
A Sensitivity Analysis of Power Signal Methods for Detecting Hardware Trojans Under Real Process and Environmental Conditions Reza Rad, Member, IEEE, Jim Plusquellic, Member, IEEE, and Mohammad Tehranipoor, Senior Member, IEEE Abstract—Trust in reference to integrated circuits addresses the concern that the design and/or fabrication of the integrated circuit (IC) may be purposely altered by an adversary. The insertion of a hardware Trojan involves a deliberate and malicious change to an IC that adds or removes functionality or reduces its reliability. Trojans are designed to disable and/or destroy the IC at some future time or they may serve to leak confidential information covertly to the adversary. Trojans can be cleverly hidden by the adversary to make it extremely difficult for chip validation processes, such as manufacturing test, to accidentally discover them. This paper investigates the sensitivity of a power supply transient signal analysis method for detecting Trojans. In particular, we focus on determining the smallest detectable Trojan, i.e., the least number of gates a Trojan may have and still be detected, using a set of process simulation models that characterize a TSMC 0.18 m process. We also evaluate the sensitivity of our Trojan detection method in the presence of measurement noise and background switching activity. Index Terms—Hardware security, testing, Trojan, very large scale integration. I. INTRODUCTION T HE globalization of the integrated circuit (IC) industry in combination with the dramatic increases in the complexity of ICs have raised new concerns regarding their trustworthiness [1], [2]. The threat is the malicious modification to the function of an IC such as the inclusion of additional circuitry designed to enable an adversary to corrupt data or destroy, disable or remotely control the IC through a back door at a time of his or her choosing. A wide range of parametric-based and functional-based malicious modifications or Trojans are possible in outsourced ICs [3]. Adversaries will employ a variety of methods to hide Trojans so that they are extremely difficult to detect through traditional manufacturing tests. For example, the inputs of an inserted Trojan will be selected so that its activation is statistically Manuscript received November 18, 2008; revised March 11, 2009. First published October 09, 2009; current version published November 24, 2010. The work of R. Rad and J. Plusquellic was supported in part by NSF Grant CNS- 0716559. The work of M. Tehranipoor was supported in part by NSF Grant CNS-0716535. R. Rad is with the University of Maryland, Baltimore, MD 21250 USA (e-mail: reza2@umbc.edu). J. Plusquellic is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131 USA (e-mail: jimp@ece. unm.edu). M. Tehranipoor is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269 USA (e-mail: tehrani@engr.uconn.edu). Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TVLSI.2009.2029117
